Exceptions to Design Right
Design right does not subsist in
certain situations (section
213(2)). Some of these designs are also excluded from the definition
of ‘design’ in the 1949 Act, as amended, so they cannot be
registered. Here, the legislation clearly looks at individual
features of the design.
Method or Principle of Construction
The
definition of design excludes the underlying principles or ideas
behind the design. If they are to be protected at all, they are
properly matters for the patent system.
‘Must Fit’ and ‘Must Match’
The
‘must fit’ and ‘must match’ exceptions are intended to
prevent design right conferring a monopoly and thereby to preserve
competition. They permit copying where design constraints compel it.
‘Must Fit’
Design right does not subsist in those parts of the design of an
article which enable an article to fit or connect to another so that
either article may perform its intended function. In
Ocular Sciences Ltd v
Aspect
Vision Care Ltd [1997]
RPC 289 Laddie
J considered that the ‘article’ which the article in the design
had to fit could be the human eye. The radius on the rear face of a
contact lens was therefore a must fit feature. In Mark
Wilkinson Furniture Ltd v Woodcraft Designs (Radcliffe) Ltd
[1998]
FSR 63, a fitted kitchen was not an article but a collection of
matching articles, so the design for the kitchen unit was not
deprived of protection. The meaning of the word “enable” was
explored by Park J in A
Fulton Co Ltd v
Grant
Barnett & Co
[2001]
R.P.C. 16, [2000]
All ER (D) 1270. This exception is particularly
intended to withdraw protection from spare parts which must fit in to
existing equipment, though it also extends to complete articles (ee
Philip
Parker v
Stephen
Tidball [1997]
FSR 680, Ch D.) including some species of design
that will be little more than one big must-fit feature (like a mobile
phone case): it is particularly directed at those which offer
interfaces enabling them to be fitted together: Electronic
Techniques (Anglia) Ltd
v
Critcheley
Components Ltd [1997]
FSR401, Ch D. In Fulton, however, a case
for a folding umbrella was not a must-fit design:
It
would in my view be unacceptable to construe the provision as meaning
that any article which is shaped so about cover or contain another
article cannot qualify for design right.
In
the Parker
case
(which on the face of it seems hard to reconcile with this view)
there was infringement of features in the design of which there was
design freedom, so the ‘must-fit’ argument was not conclusive.
Notice
that it is not the design for the spare part itself which is excluded
from protection, but only the design of those features of shape or
configuration of the article which enable it to fit. A competitor who
wishes to produce an article will still be prevented from copying the
free-standing parts of the design but will be able to copy the
connecting or ‘must fit’ features. These may be applied to the
second design to produce a competing article which will fit and
function.
In the Baby Dan case, the deputy
judge, David Young QC, gave a purposive construction to the must-fit
exception. The claimant could rely on design right relating to
various parts of a larger article, so the must fit exception would
not exclude from protection the shape or configuration of the parts
necessary to enable them to be assembled. A similar approach,
recognising design right in component parts and restricting the must
fit exception, informs the decision of Park J in Frayling
Furniture v Premier Upholstery Ltd. (1999)
22(5) I.P.D. 22051.
In Novum (Overseas) Ltd v
Iceland Foods plc and Austria Haustechnik
[2002]
EWHC 53 the High Court considered the effect of
the so-called must fit exception to design right. The defendants had
made and imported freezer cabinets that reproduced the claimant’s
design (drawings of which the first defendant had obtained under the
pretence that they were needed for shop layout design purposes:
infringement of copyright by reproducing the drawings was admitted).
The
first defendant argued that it was co-owner of the design, having had
some input into the design work. The judge held that it had not done
sufficient to produce this result, and even if it had dealings in a
jointly owned design needed the consent of all owners.
Though
freezer cabinets are not the most exciting pieces of design work
around, the judge considered that a combination of commonplace
features could attract unregistered design right protection. The
model in suit was quite different in overall appearance to prior
designs that had been put in evidence. The defendants’ freezer was
a substantial reproduction of the design, and notwithstanding the
evidence the judge held that it had been copied and therefore
infringed design right. However, dividers and gaskets which formed
part of the cabinet were commonplace and also were covered by the
must fit exception.
The
second defendant escaped an award of additional damages as it had
been unaware of unregistered design right and had trued to produce a
design that was not a copy.
‘Must Match’
The
‘must match’ exception excludes from protection features which
are dependent upon the appearance of another article of which the
article is intended by the designer to form an integral part.
It
is intended to apply where there is a need for articles which are
part of a single object to match the appearance of the rest of that
object as a whole - it does not apply to pieces from a set of
cutlery.
The
exception is intended to cover the situation where a part is needed
to restore the aesthetic appearance of an article. In such a case
certain features of the design may be covered by the ‘must fit ‘
exception. The other features of the design are not free-standing
since the designer must reproduce the shape of the item being
replaced if their article is going to serve as a viable replacement.
So, wherever, aesthetically, there is no design freedom, design right
will not arise.
The
need for the features of the design to match another must be
considered, at the moment the design is created. So if the shape or
design of an article is not dependent on anything else at the time
the design is made, design right will subsist. It will be immaterial
that at some future stage the use to which the article is put creates
a must match situation.
Surface Decoration
Surface decoration is excluded from the
scope of design right, again because the right is concerned with the
overall form of an article. It may be registered (registration being
concerned with features of an article) and may also be protected by
copyright. See Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams
(Textiles) Ltd. Surface decoration means more than a design
printed or painted, or perhaps etched, onto an article – it
includes a ‘v groove’ in a kitchen unit (Mark
Wilkinson Furniture Ltd
v
Woodcraft
Designs (Radcliffe) Ltd
[1998]
FSR 63, Ch D.). In Lambretta v Teddy
Smith argument that the design was not surface decoration but the
configuration of different-coloured pieces of the garment was
rejected.
Surface
decoration is specifically excluded from the definition of a design
for the purposes of copyright, so section 51 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988 does not restrict copyright protection.
The design right exception is not restricted to situations where dual
protection actually exists.
Requirements for Protection
Originality
Design right only subsists in original designs. The basic test of
originality is that the design must be independent in the sense that
it is not a copy although it need not necessarily be novel. In C &
H Engineering v F Klucznik & Sons Ltd
(the Pig Fenders case) [1992]
FSR 427 Aldous J held that the same test as
imposed in copyright law would be appropriate: that the design was
not copied but the independent work of the designer. A design may be
original in that is it is not copied, but may not be novel for the
purposes of the Registered Designs Act because it has been previously
published.
Section 213 provides that original
designs attract UDR protection: but a design is not original if it is
commonplace in the design field in question. However, a design may,
it seems, be original but also commonplace and therefore denied
protection: see Scholes Windows Ltd v Magnet Ltd
[2001]
EWCA Civ 532, [2002] FSR 10.
In Interlego v Tyco
Industries [1989]
1 AC 217, [1988] 3 All ER 949, [1988] RPC 343 the
Privy Council held that a design was not original where the only
original input of the designer was to make modifications to the
design drawings which were indistinguishable in the article made to
the design. Amongst other changes, the radii on the corners of the
bricks were altered. This did not start a new term of protection
running. In Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd
[1997]
RPC 289 Laddie
J held that although designs (in suit, for contact lenses) which
looked the same to the naked eye could enjoy design right protection,
merely changing the scale of an existing design would not create a
fresh right. The commonplace exclusion applies to designs that are
‘trite, trivial, common-or-garden, hackneyed or of the type that
would excite no particular attention in those in the relevant art.’
However, he did not think it right to try to advance a definition of
the term.
In Spraymiser the High Court was
asked to consider whether the claimant’s design was original for
the purposes of unregistered design right. The defendant had
purchased in the United States a wooden mannequin which could be
reconfigured to form different items of furniture. The defendant
described it to the claimant in the UK, suggesting that the claimant
might develop something similar which the defendant would advertise
in its mail order catalogue. Now there was some dispute about whether
the defendant had shown the device to the claimant.
The
claimant subsequently developed a similar design which was marketed
by the defendant for several years until 1997 when the defendant
stopped ordering the product from the claimant and found another
supplier, using the claimant’s product as a template. The claimant
sued for infringement of unregistered design rights and for breach of
contract.
On
the evidence, the Court decided that the claimant had never had
access to the American model. Similarities between the two devices
were inevitable because they were both representations of the human
form, but this did not preclude the possibility that the claimant’s
work was original.
Commonplace designs
Sub-section (4) adds a further
limitation, requiring that a design is not commonplace, thus
excluding designs which, while they are not copies, are no more than
an expression of what is widely known in the design field in
question. In the Pig Fenders case the judge described the
‘commonplace’ provision as imposing a requirement akin to
novelty. He found that certain features of the pig fenders in suit
were commonplace, so that although they were common to the
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s designs, there was no
infringement. But in Amoena v Trulife [1996]
IPD 19006 the court considered novelty
unnecessary. Consideration of the prior art may nevertheless be
relevant, as in Lone Star Toys Ltd v JM Enterprises of
Wetherby Ltd. [1996]
FSR 857.
In Farmer
Build Ltd v Carier Bulk Materials Ltd and others
[2000]
ECDR 42, [1999] RPC461 (CA)The Times, 23 December 1998 (Ch D)
the plaintiff manufactured and marketed slurry separators. One of its
products was problematical, and it agreed with the defendant that a
new machine would be designed on the basis of two of the plaintiff’s
old designs and improving on them. The relationship broke down: the
defendant subsequently started to produce its own slurry separators
which were externally different from those it had designed for the
plaintiff but internally virtually identical.
The
defendant claimed that the individual parts of the machines, and the
machines themselves, were commonplace in the design field at the time
of their creation. The court considered that the correct approach was
to compare the design of the article in which UDR is claimed with the
design of other articles in the same field, including the alleged
infringing one. The material time for this exercise is when the
design is created. A design copied from the design of an earlier
article will not be original, and it is not necessary to consider
whether it is commonplace or not.
Whether it is commonplace is determined
by ascertaining the degree of similarity to the design of similar,
independent articles in the same design field. In
Scholes
Windows v
Magnet
Ltd the
field was windows, not uPVC windows, so the earlier use of a similar
design on Victorian windows counted against the modern design being
protected. This is to be done objectively, in
the light of the evidence (including expert evidence) but is a
question of fact and degree for the court. If there are aspects of
the plaintiff’s design not found in other designs in the field,
except the defendant’s, the court can conclude that the design was
not commonplace. In Scholes the horn design had been used on
windows for many years and was therefore commonplace. In the case of
a decorative design where there is greater design freedom, as was the
case there, the Farmers Build guidelines will be less
help.
The guidelines were applied by the High
Court (Rattee J) in Round Imports v PML Redfearn Ltd [1999]
CIPA 725, upheld
sub
nom Round
Imports v
Rexam
Glass Barnsley Ltd by
the Court of Appeal, 5 October 2000. This
concerned UDR in a tall-necked bottle designed for the plaintiff for
its Red Eye beverage. The design of the Red Eye bottle was original
in that it was not a copy of another design: it was however very
similar to a Miller bottle which the plaintiffs had provided to the
defendant as a model, and although there were minor variations in
shape and dimension they were not in the judge’s view sufficient to
make the bottle significantly different from the Miller bottle or any
other tall-necked bottle available at the time. Glass designers have
always considered small differences sufficient, but it seems that the
law differs from their view and their designs will now be open to
copying. However, that case was decided on other grounds.
The guidelines were also applied in the
Jo-Y-Jo case, where expert evidence showed that the cardigan
designs in question were ‘classic’. Embellishing the garments
with embroidery and edging did not prevent the designs being
commonplace. In Fulton, a claim to unregistered design right
in the handle and case of a folding umbrella was upheld: to enable
functional designs to enjoy any protection, the judge (Park J) said,
a narrow interpretation of what is commonplace was needed. Merely
because references to two designs of close similarity could be shown
was insufficient. Very minor changes of line or angle can have a
significant effect on a design (as happened in Scholes).
In Spraymiser Ltd. v Wrightway
Marketing Ltd. [2000]
ECDR 349 (High Court) the deputy judge took the
view that the field was extremely small, consisting as it did of only
two designs, namely the American one and the claimant’s. There were
sufficient differences between them that the claimant’s design was
not commonplace within the field. Had there been a greater number of
candidates, more differences may (it is submitted) have been needed.
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